Digital Commons at St. Mary's University
Faculty CLE

School of Law Faculty Scholarship

1984

Legislative Changes in the Law: Victims-Witnesses Young and Old
Gerald S. Reamey

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.stmarytx.edu/faccle
Part of the Criminal Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Gerald S. Reamey, Legislative Changes in the Law: Victims-Witnesses Young and Old, Special Criminal
Law Institute Assault (April 6, 1984).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law Faculty Scholarship at Digital
Commons at St. Mary's University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty CLE by an authorized administrator
of Digital Commons at St. Mary's University. For more information, please contact sfowler@stmarytx.edu,
jcrane3@stmarytx.edu.

l

.

\

I

1

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LEGISLATIVE mANGES IN 1HE LAW:

VIC'l'IMS - WITNESSES

YOONG AND OLD

"Assaults on the Yotmg and Old"
"Legal Remedial Alternatives for Spouse Abuse in Texas"
Prof. Gerald S. Reamey
San Antonio

TRIAL TACI'ICS AND MJI'IONS PRACTICES
E. G.

~rris

Austin
EXTRANEOOS OFFENSES
''Extraneous Offenses in Assault Cases" - Outline
Court of Appeals Opinion and Dissenting Opinion: Garza

v. Texas

Petition for Discretionary Review: State and Appellant's Briefs
J. Stephen Cooper
Dallas
1HE BAITERED WIFE SYNDR(}.ffi
"The Trials of Vickie Daniel"
Jack B. Zimmermann
Houston
DFMJNSTRATIVE AND FORENSIC EVIDEOCE
"Observations on Forensic Evidence in Capital Murder Cases"
M. P. "Rusty" lAmcan, II I
Denton

OROIESTRATING 1HE COORTROCM DRAMA
James D. Montgomery
Chicago

CO-DEFENMNI'S, INFORMANTS AND HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS
Gerald H. Goldstein
San Antonio

LEGISLATIVE CHANGES IN THE LAW :
VICTIMS-WITNESSES
YOUNG AND OLD

Professor Gerald S. Reamey
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•
ASSAULTS ON THE YOUNG AND OLD

•
•

This paper will survey the development of law concerning
assaults on the young and the elderly with special emphasis on
recently enacted and amended statutory provisions.

Specifically,

this discussion of assaultive conduct focuses on Penal Code Section 22.04, Injury to a Child or an Elderly Individual, and related provisions in the Texas Penal Code and Code of Criminal
Procedure.

Not addressed will be the recodified but familiar

sections of the Penal Code dealing with Sexual Assault of a child
(Section 22 . 011) or Aggravated Sexual Assault of a Child (Section
22.021) .

Also not included in this paper are materials dealing

with the new crime of Violation of Court Order, a distinct offense created to criminalize violation of protective orders issued under Section 71.11 of the Texas Family Code.

For more in-

formation on this subject, see the article entitled "Legal Remedial Alternatives for Spouse Abuse in Texas" included in these
course materials.
Many of the statutory provisions considered here are in whole
or in part the product of recent legislation.

Some of what fol-

lows is, •therefore, necessarily conjecture based on legislative
history, trends, and decisions under similar provisions in current
or prior law.

-
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INJURY TO A CHILD OR ELDERLY INDIVIDUAL

I.

Generally

[_

A.

Prior Law .

[

As regards children, this offense was previously codified
in Article 1148a of the Penal Code, a provision that was not
added until 1971.

The original statute prohibited the inten-

tional maiming, disfiguring, or battering of a child 14 years
of age or younger by any person, including the parent of the
child.

[_

[_

c·

The prohibition extended to engaging in conduct by omis-

sion or commission which was intended to cause any physical injury or deformity or deficiency to such a child.

In essence, the

inclusion of omissions with intent to cause the proscribed result established a special duty of care standard with respect to
those 14 years and younger.
Violation of Article 1148a was the equivalent of a third
degree felony, and no distinction was made in levels of culpability or degree of injury in ascertaining the punishment.

L

[__

c:

c-c_

It was, however, a defense that the assault was committed by a
parent, guardian, master (over an apprentice}, or teacher and
was "done in the exercise of the right of moderate restraint or
correction .

.

.

"

See TEX. PENAL CODE art. 1148a (Vernon 1971).

The elderly were not protected by a specific article in the
former code, but the aggravated assault statute did recognize a
category of assault involving the elderly and infirm.
PENAL CODE art. 1147(4}

(Vernon 1971} .

See TEX.

Under that provision,

assault (as defined in article 1138} became aggravated under a
-
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variety of circumstances, one of which was "[w]hen committed by
a person of robust health or strength upon one who is aged or
decrepit."

TEX. PENAL CODE art. 1147(4)

(Vernon 1971).

The

punishment range for aggravated assault under the prior Code
was by fine of $25 to $1,000 or imprisonment from one month to
two years, or both. TEX. PENAL CODE art. 1148 (Vernon 1950).
When the present Penal Code was enacted, assaults to children
were covered by Section 22.04, but assaults on the elderly were
covered only under the general provisions pertaining to all

adul t~ .

The look of Section 22.04, had, however, changed dramatically.
The offense was now tied to all four levels of culpability resulting in either serious bodily injury, serious physical or
mental deficiency or impairment, or deformity to a child 14 years
of age or younger.

Responsibility by omission or failure to act

was retained, and the offense was punished much more severely,
as a second degree felony.

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. Sec. 22.04

·(Vernon 1974).

B.

The Present Code.
One of the most striking historical features of the current

section dealing with assaults to children and the elderly is
its ephemeral . nature.

Since its adoption, it has been amended

{often substantially) repeatedly.

In 1977, the format of the

level of injury sustained was altered by listing "serious bodily
injury;" "serious physical or mental deficiency or impairment;"
and "disfigurement or deformity" as distinct categories of injury.

Also, very importantly, the 1977 amendment distinguished

-
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[
the level of punishment by relating it to the level of culpability
employed in commission of the crime.

If it was done with reck-

lessness or criminal negligence, the punishment dropped to the
third degree felony range.

[
[

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. Sec. 22.04

[

(Vernon Supp. 1978) •
The Section was further amended in 1979 by adding "bodily
injury" to the list of injury levels proscribed

by the statute .

With this addition came a separate punishment provision for infliction of this least serious resulting harm.

[

[

TEX. PENAL CODE

ANN. Sec. 22.04 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
Finally, in 1981 the Legislature reshaped the coverage of
the statute to cover assaults on the elderly, defined as those
65 years of age or older, and continued the development of its

[
[

[

punishment scheme based on a combination of culpability and
level of injury.
1982-83).

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. Sec. 22.04 (Vernon Supp.

The result of this reliance on various factors to de-

fine punishment is a convoluted and often confusing set of ele-

[
[

ments of proof and a jury charge that may be truly baffling.

[

II.

c

Elements of the Offense

A person commits the offense of Injury to a Child or Elderly

(a)

intentionally;

r

(b)

knowingly;

(

(c)

recklessly; or

(d)

criminally negligently

!ndividual if he:
[1]

[

[

L.
L

(2]

by act or omission engages in conduct that causes

[3]

(a) serious bodily injury;
(b)

serious physical or mental deficiency or impairment;

(4]

(c)

disfigurement or deformity; or

(d)

bodily injury

(a)

to a child who is 14 years or younger or

(b)

to an individual who is 65 years or older.

a.

Proof of Culpability

Section 22.04 is one of the few sections of the Penal Code
to employ all four levels of culpability in defining an offense.
Indeed, it is one of the few to base criminal responsibility on
negligence.

As might be expected, a number of cases decided

since the introduction of culpability as the primary determinator
of punishment have explored the evidence of culpability and
interpreted its application to this statute.

[The general defi-

nitions of culpability relating to criminal offenses are found in
Penal Code Section 6.03.]
One of the more instructive cases involving intent to injure
a child is Beggs v. State, 597 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
In Beggs, the defendant requested a mistake of fact instruction
on evidence that, in placing her granddaughter in scalding hot
bathwater, she operated under the reasonable mistaken belief that
the water was of a normal temperature.

The trial court refused her

requested charge, and the State argued on appeal that she was not

- 5 -
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entitled to the charge since the wording of the statute that
the actor "engages in conduct that causes .

serious bodily

injury; • • • " should be read as requiring only a showing that
defendant intentionally or knowingly engaged in the conduct; not
that she did so intending to cause the resulting injury.

597

S.W.2d at 376.
Noting that the real difference between Section 22.04
and the general assault provisions of Section 22.01 and 22.02
is that Section 22.04 adds a stiffer penalty for assaults
against children, the Beggs Court rejected the State's contention.
597 S.W.2d at 377.

The Court equated the "intentionally or

knowingly" allegation of culpability in the indictment to be
the equivalent of an allegation " . • .

(1) that it was her

conscious objective or desire to cause serious bodily injury and
(2) that she was aware that her conduct was reasonably certain
to cause serious bodily injury."

597 S.W. 2d at 377.

After this holding in Beggs, it was anticlimactic for the
Court to find the requested charge required if the e v idence
demonstrated a reasonable mistaken belief on the part of the
de fendant concerning a matter of fact (the temperature of the
water) which belief negated a conscious objective or desire to
cause serious bodily injury or an awareness that her conduct was
reasonably certain to cause serious bodily injury.

597 S.W.2d

at 378.

In other words, if a reasonable mistake about the

water's

temperature would have negated defendant's culpability,

here intent or knowledge , the trial court was obliged to give
the requested charge under Penal--Code Section 8.02.

- 6 -
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The deceased, a 37 month-old child, was brought to the hospital
severely bruised with no pulse or respiration.

I
I

At the time of

the death, the child was having a period of visitation with her
father, the defendant.

In holding the evidence sufficient to

establish the intent of the defendant to cause serious bodily
injury, the Court relied on testimony by the mother that the child
had no bruises when she was picked up by the defendant for the
visitation and the testimony by the treating physicians and medical examiner that some of the many bruises found on the body were
less than seventy-two hours old.

635 S.W.2d at 795.

The Whitely Court also considered an extrajudicial confession

[

[
[
[

[

in which the defendant admitted having hit the deceased child on
the side of her head at least four times.

Since the medical

examiner's testimony was that the cause of death was blunt trauma
to the head which could have been caused by a hand, the Court
held the statement adequately corroborated and the evidence suffi-

[
[
[

cient, notwithstanding the physical evidence contradicting the
mother's testimony that the child was previously unmarked .

635

S.W.2d at 796-97.
Recklessness was the level of culpability alleged in Hooker v.
State, 621 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. Crim. App . 1980).

Again, the evidence

[

[
[

was circumstantial, consisting of a peculiar pattern of burns apparently caused by placing the child in very hot water for a long
period and the somewhat ambiguous

e~cited

dant, "It's my fault, I did it."

621 S.W.2d at 599-600.

utterance of the defen-

Recklessness, of course, requires only an awareness on the
part of the actor that a substantial and unjustifiable risk exists

L
[

L

L
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that a result will occur or that circumstances exist.
CODE ANN.

Sec. 6.03(c)

(Vernon 1974).

TEX. PENAL

The Court had no trouble

finding in Hooker that the circumstantial evidence excluded all
reasonable hypotheses other than the guilt of the accused, and
that the jury was justified in finding that the conduct was engaged in recklessly .

621 S.W.2d at 601- 02.

Criminal negligence differs from recklessness in that the
actor need not actually be aware of the substantial and

unjusti ~

fiable risk; it is sufficient if he " ought to be aware" of the
r.isk .

TEX . PENAL CODE ANN. Sec. 6.03(d}

(Vernon 1974).

Although

the defendant in Phillips v. State, 588 S.W. 2d 378 (Tex . Crim . App .
1979), did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence of his
criminal negligence, he did attack the standard of care imposed
on a defendant by the statutory definition of criminal negl i gence
as unconstitutionally vague.

588 S.W.2d at 380.

Citing Lewis v. State, 529 S.W.2d 550 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975} ,
a case upholding the criminally negligent homicide statute against
similar attack, and Nabors v . State, a case upholding the constitutionality of the predecessor of Section 22 . 04 (Article 1148aic)),
the Court of Criminal Appeals rejected appellant's claim.

The

Court i n Phillips noted that the law could not poss i bly anticipate
all situations in which an actor's conduct would be a gross devi ation from the standard of care expected of an "ordinary person"
under the circumstances .

588 S . W.2d at 381.

Criminal rtegligence

as defined by Section 6.03(d} provides adequate notice of the
requirements of law and the conduct forbidden.

- 9 -
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b.

The Act Requirement

I

In Texas, every offense requires voluntary conduct together
with the required level of culpability.
Sec. 6.01 (Vernon 1974).

This voluntary conduct may be an act,

an omission, or possession.
(Vernon 1974).

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN .

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. Sec. 6.0l(a)

Where an omission to act is the basis for the

offense, one is criminally responsible only when a statute pro-

(

[
[

[

vides that the omission is an offense or otherwise establishes
a duty to act .

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. Sec. 6.0l(c)

(Vernon 1974) .

It will be remembered that one of the peculiar features of
Section 22.04 is its specific reference to commission of the
offense with the requisite mental state "by act or omission,"

[
[

[_

resulting in one of the levels of injury to a child or elderly
person.

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. Sec. 22.04(a)

(Vernon Supp. 1982-83).

It is easy to hypothesize situations in which the defendant,
whether he be parent, babysitter, or teacher, injures the child
or elderly person (especially where the elderly are under the

[
[

[

care of a professional care-giver as in a nursing home) by
failing to do that which is required.

The difficulty often comes

in determining just what duty is established by law.
The duties of a parent are established by statute with some

[

c-

Among these are the provision of medical care, food, shelter ,

r

clothing, and education.

[

specificity.

See TEX . FAM . CODE ANN. Sec. 12 . 04 (Vernon 1974) .

Id.

In an Injury to a Child case in-

volving the failure of a parent to provide medical care to a
child, the Court of Criminal Appeals addressed responsibility by
omission.

Ronk v. State, 544 S.W.2d 123 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) .

- 10 -
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The Court held in Ronk that since an omission does not form
the basis for criminal responsibility unless a statute so provides,
the omission reference of Section 22.04 is operative only when
a specific statute creating a duty exists.

544 S.W.2d at 125.

Of course, the parents' duty to provide medical care is well established by the Family Code, but in Ronk the indictment contained
no allegation that the defendant stood in that relationship with
the injured child.

544 S.W.2d at 124.

Failure to allege are-

lationship which places the accused under a statutory duty to
act is a fundamental defect in a charging instrument for Injury
to a Child or Elderly Individual.

544 S.W.2d at 125.

In a more recent case in which the parental relationship
was properly alleged in the indictment, the Court of Criminal
Appeals explored the sufficiency of the evidence in an Injury to
a Child case charging failure to provide food and medical treatrnent resulting in the death of a four and half month old baby.
Ahearn v. State, 588 S.W.2d 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).

The

indictment alleged that the defendants acted with recklessness
or criminal negligence and that ''serious physical deficiency"
resulted.

588 S.W.2d at 329.

The defendants in Ahearn had apparently sought no medical
care for their deceased child although i t was available at no
cost.

Also, there was ample evidence that they had left the

child unattended for long periods of time in filthy conditions
while his condition deteriorated.

588 S.W.2d at 337.

Since it

was alleged that the physical condition was caused reckless·ly
or with criminal negligence, the Court held that it was not neces-

- 11 -

[
sary for the State to prove either the specific causes of the

[

ailments or that the defendants specifically intended the results.

[

588 S.W.2d at 337.

c.

[

Proof of Resulting Injury

The third element of Injury to a Child or Elderly Individual
is the measurement of the injury involved in terms of its seriousness.

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. Sec. 22.04(a)

(Vernon Supp . 1982-83) .

Language from the previous Code has been retained, but "bodily
injury" will now also suffice to establish criminal responsibility .

[

[_

c·
[-

Id .
"Serious bodily injury" is perhaps the highest level of injury contemplated by the statute .

The term is defined by the

Penal Code as, "bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of
death or that causes death, serious permanent disfigurement, or
protracted loss or ,impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ."

(_

TEX . PENAL CODE ANN. Sec . 1.07(a) (34)

(Vernon 1974) .

[

L
[

Since the second and third injury levels are, respectively,
"serious physical or mental deficiency or impairment" and "disfigurement or deformity," it might be thought that these resulting injuries are already described within the term "serious
bodily injury."

But in Morter v. State, 551 S.W.2d 715 (Tex.

[

L
[

Crim. App. 1977), the Court of Criminal Appeals drew a sharp
distinction between the kinds of injury to which the statute is
addressed.

In Morter, the indictment alleged that the defendant

caused the child victim "serious bodily injury," while the trial

- 12 -
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court, in appl y ing the law to the facts, permitted a conviction
if the jury found that the defendant caused either "serious
physical deficiency or impairment" or "deformity."

551 S.W.2d at

718.
Acknowledging that the Penal Code does not define deficiency ,
impairment, or deformity, the Court held in Morter that no presumption of redundancy arises simply because there is no statutory definition.

551 S.W.2d at 718 .

Further, the Court con-

cluded that the Legislature must have intended some purpose for
every word of its enactment and, therefqre, Section 22 . 04 proscribes three types of conduct (now four types) .
718.

551 S.W.2d at

Permitting the jury to convict on any level of injury found

when serious bodily injury was alleged in the indictment was
therefore

fundamen~al

error.

551 S.W.2d at 718-19.

Unquestionably, there is some ov erlap in any ordinary reading
of the injuries proscribed.

For example, "serious physical • • •

impairment., seems virtually the same as "protracted . .
ment of the function of any bodily member or organ."
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN . Sec. 22.04(a)
PENAL CODE ANN. Sec. 1.07(a) (34)

. impair-

Compare

(Vernon 1982-83) with TEX.

(Vernon 1974) .

Only the require-

ment that serious bodily injury involve "protracted" impairment
separates the two in any meaningful way .

In short, the serious

bodily injury definition i s actually a bit more restrictive in
this regard than the language of Section 22 . 04 suggests.
In a proper case, it would seem, therefore, that notwithstanding the holding in Morter, an indictment alleging "serious
bodily injury" should support a conviction where the proof was
of "serious physical impairment."

And perhaps more important

- 13 -

than these semantic subtleties is the obvious fact that proof
of either level of injury would result in precisely the same
punishment under Section 22.04.

See " Punishment," infra .

If "serious bod i ly injury" has been alleged, numerous cases
e x ist construing the meaning of the statutory definition and the
sufficiency of proof on this point.

Many of these cases arise

in other contexts, such as aggravated assault, aggravated robbery,
simple assault, murder, and even terroristic threat.
While cases testing the sufficiency of evidence of serious
bodily injury under Section 22 . 04 or its predecessor are less
common, a general sense of the term may be had from a review of
some of them.

For instance, death clearly constitutes serious

bodily injury, Whitely v . State, 635 S . W. 2d 791, 792 (Tex. App. Tyler 1982, no pet.), as does loss of an eye, hand and wrist .
Phillips v. State, 588 S . W.2d 378, 379 - 80 (Tex . Crirn. App . 1979) .
Serious bodily injury was also established by second degree
burns that caused a serious threat of death.
621 S.W. 2d 597, 600-01 (Tex. Crim. App . 1980).

Hooker v . State,
Of course, not

I
[
[

all burns, even those creating scars , will necessarily constitute
serious bodily injury .
(Tex. Crim . App . 1977)

Cf. Morter v. State, 551 S . W. 2d 715, 717
[physician testified on direct and cross

exami natio n that burns inflicted on the child did not amount to
serious bodily injury as it was defined for him].

the Court held that bruises that healed without medication and
t h at were not symptomatic of injuries causing future medical prob-

at 128.

596 S.W. 2d

Also , burns on the child's back apparently caused by a

... 14 -

[
[

In Pickering v. State, 596 S . W. 2d 124 (Tex . Crim. App. 1980),

lems would not be classified as serious bodily i njury.

[

r
[

[

[

cigarette which formed the letters "i-c-r-y" were held not bo be
serious bodily injury absent evidence that the child's skin would
be scarred sufficiently to cause protracted loss or impairment
of the function of a bodily member or organ .

596 S.W.2d at 128.

One wonders whether the Pickering case would have had a different
result with respect to the proof of injury if the State had alleged "disfigurement or deformity" instead of serious bodily injury.
"Serious physical or mental deficiency or impairment," the
second category of injury in Section 22.04, is not defined in the
Penal Code.

The Court of Criminal Appeals, in Ahearn v. State,

588 S.W.2d 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979), noted in considering the
meaning of the term that "[a] deficiency does not have to cause
or contribute to death before a jury is warranted in finding it
'serious.'"

588 S.W.2d at 336.

In finding evidence of serious

physical deficiency sufficient, the Court considered the severely
emaciated condition of the deceased child's body together with
the "nature, extent and variety" of his injuries.

Id.

Appellants also contended in Ahearn that the phrase "serious
physical deficiency" should be defined for the jury in the court's
charge, and that its inherent vagueness rendered it unconstitutional .
588 S.W.2d at 337.

Citing King v. State, the Court held that the

term "serious physical deficiency" was the sort of simple, common
language used in its ordinary meaning that jurors are supposed
to know without further definition by the trial court.

588 S.W.2d

at 337-38.
Nor did the Court find the term vague.

The appellants in Ahearn

were adequately apprised of the meaning of the term since persons
15 -

[
of ordinary intelligence need not necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application.

[_

588 S.W.2d at 338;

[_

see Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 u.s. 156, 92
s.ct. 839, 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972).
The same result may be expected to obtain from consideration
of the mental deficiency or impairment segment of the statute.

[

[_

In Vaughn v. State, 530 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975), the
Court held evidence that the defendant had kissed and licked the

[__

back of the child sufficient to establish mental deficiency or
impairment on testimony from a psychologist that the victim coul d
reasonably be expected to suffer psychological damage in the
future.

530 S.W.2d at 561.

[

[

Vaughn's willingness to consider

sufficient highly speculative evidence of possible future mental

[_

impairment clearly demonstrates the latitude the Court is willing

[

to allow in these cases.
The third kind of injury supporting a conviction under Section
22.04 is "disfigurement or deformity," another term not statutorily
defined.

As previously noted, these injuries would seem included

within the definition of serious bodily injury, and in some cases
they may be treated in that way.

For example, if the disfigure-

ment is not permanent, it is not serious bodily injury but may be
"disfigurement" within the meaning of the Section 22.04 term.

See

Pickering v. State, 596 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) {holding
that burns on the back of the child were not serious bodily injury
since they would not cause permanent disfigurement] •
Presumably, "disfigurement or deformity" needs no definition
in the court's charge.

Cf. Ahearn v. State, 588 S.W.2d 327,

337-38 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).

And if the Court follows its own
- 16 -
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lead in Ahearn, it will also reject claims that the phrase is
unconstitutionally vague.

Id .

Of course, all of this bodes ill for those defending persons
accused of assaulting children or the elderly since the jury is
left without guidance in applying these terms, and the Court
has been reluctant to find, as a matter of law, that the evidence
in such cases, no matter how slight, is insufficient.

None of

this is particularly surprising in light of the distasteful

nature

of these prosecutions and the often egregious circumstances involved .

But it is in precisely such cases that the jury should

be given as little leeway as possible in bringing emotional reaction to bear on findings of fact .

Moreover, even if a definition

is given the jury, the breadth of the three most serious levels
of injury described in Section 22.04 arguably provide more than
adequate opportunities for application of the harshest penalty
provided by the statute.
If by chance the evidence in a case does not prove any of the
three most debilitating varieties of injury, an offense is nevertheless committed upon infliction of "bodily injury," the fourth
level of injury in Section 22.04.

This term is, of course, statu-

torily defined and used throughout the Penal Code.
"Bodily injury" means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition.
(Vernon 1974).

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN . Sec. l.07(a) (7)

It is difficult to imagine any level of injury so

slight that it would not be encompassed by this definition unless
it amounts to no more than an offensive touching, a minor assault
in its own right.

See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. Sec. 22.0l(a} (3)

- 17 -

[
(Vernon 1974).

[

For instance, a conviction for injury to a child

was had on evidence that the defendant choked and struck his
child.

Skelton v. State, 626 S.W.2d 589 (Tex. App. - Texarkana

1981, no pet.).

Indeed, it is difficult to find any cases where

appellants complain about sufficiency of the evidence to prove
that bodily injury was done.
If the use of bodily injury as a predicate for criminal

[_

responsibility seems redundant in light of the simple assault
statute, bear in mind that the punishment range for injury to a
child or elderly individual involving bodily injury falls in
either the third degree felony or Class A misdemeanor range.

[
[
[

In

[~

[-

Skelton v. State, the Court of Appeals refused a claim that the
defendant was entitled to a charge on the lesser included offense
of simple assault, pointing out that the distinguishing factor
involved is the age of the victim.
simple assault becomes "aggravated."

If a child is involved, the
Skelton v. State, 626 S.W.2d

589 (Tex. App. -Texarkana 1981, no pet.).

L
[

L
[

d.

Age of the Victim

[

Since it is the youth or advanced age of the victim that
renders the assault "aggravated" and susceptible of a harsher
punishment, proof of the age of the victim is an important
element under Section 22 . 04.
22.04{a)

See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.

{Vernon Supp. 1982-83).

Sec.

For purposes of the statute,

a "child" is one 14 years of age or younger, and an "elderly
individual" is one 65 years of age or older.
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The phrase '' 14 years of age of younger" has been construed
to include all children who have not attained their fifteenth
birthday.
App. 1979).

Phillips v. State, 588 S.W . 2d 378, 380 (Tex. Crim.
This interpretation is based on the rule of con-

struction codified in the Penal Code that "(a] person attains a
specified age on the day of the anniversary of his birthdate."
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. Sec. 1.06 (Vernon 1974).

One assumes that

application of this rule to the elderly is markedly simpler; an
individual who has attained his sixty-fifth birthday is covered
by the statute.
In an interesting case involving the age of the victim in a
prosecution under Section 22.04, the Court of Appeals held that
knowledge of the age of victim was not a requisite element and
need not be pled or proved.

Huff v. State, 660 S.W.2d 635, 638

(Tex. App. - Corpus Christi 1983).

The Huff Court also upheld a

denial of jury instruction on mistake of fact defense because there
was no evidence before the trial court that the defendant had
formed a mistaken belief regarding the complainant's

age.

Id.

While it is true that Section 22.04 does not, on its face, require knowledge of the age of the victim by the accused, refusal
of a mistake of fact instruction would seem to be improper in a
case in which _the evidence properly raised a reasonable mistaken
belief as to the victim's age.

See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. Sec. 8 . 02

(Vernon 1974); Lynch v. State, 643 S.W. 2d 737 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
The Huff case is a good example of the kind of situation giving
rise to the defense.

The complainant, although a "child," was

6'1" tall, weighed 195 pounds and owned his own shrimp boat.

- i9 -

660

[
S.W.2d at 638.

It is not hard to imagine that a reasonable

mistaken belief concerning age might have been shown by defendant and believed by the jury.

If so, he could still have been

[
[

convicted of any lesser included offense of which he would be
guilty if the fact were as he believed.
8.02(b)

TEX. PENAL CODE Sec.

(Vernon 1974).

The question would then turn on whether assault is a lesser
included offense of Injury to a Child or Elderly Individual.

[
[

[

While proof of assault is established by the same or less than
all the facts required to establish an offense under Section
22.04, it is arguably not true that assault differs from Injury
to a Child only in a lesser injury being required, a lesser culpable mental state sufficing, or in one constituting an attempt
to commit the other.

See TEX. CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 37.09

(Vernon 1981).
No court seems to have addressed this point, although two
cases have discussed similar problems.

In Sanford v. State,

634 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982), the Court refused to

[
[

[
[
[
[

reverse a conviction for aggravated assault on the grounds that
the victim was 14 years of age or younger.

Appellant relied

on the rule that a specific statute will control a general

on~,

but the Court, after recognizing that proof of a Section 22.04
violation was present,

refused to reverse, noting that the of-

fense of which appellant was found guilty was of a lesser grade
and involved a lesser punishment than Injury to a Child or
Elderly Individual.

634 S.W.2d at 851-52.

In Skelton v. State, 626 S.W.2d 589 {Tex. App. - Texarkana
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1981, no pet.), the Court rejected appellant's contention that

I
I
I
I

the trial court should have charged on the "lesser included
offense of assault."

Id. at 592.

Since evidence of the victim's

age was adduced, the assault proven was "aggravated" under
Section 22.04 and no charge on a lesser included offense was
required.

Id.

Regardless of whether assault is held to be a lesser incl uded
offense of Injury to a Child or Elderly Individual, the mi stake
of fact defense remains a viable and increasingly import ant
fensive option in these cases.

d(~ ·~

The oversized "child" in Huff

may appear again, but more common will be the youthful . appearing
elderly person .

If Section 22.04 is not to become a strict lia-

bility offense, mistake of fact concerning age must be recognized
as a valid defensive issue without regard to whether knowledge is
an element of the offense.
(Tex. Crim. App. 1983).

See Lynch v. State, 643 S.W.2d 7 37

The reasonableness of a mistaken belief

about age, especially of an elderly individual, will proba bly be
far less difficult to prove than the reasonableness of many other
"mistakes" affecting culpability.

III.

Procedural Considerations

To aid in obtaining evidence for the prosecution of c ases
under Section 22.04, the Legislature enacted Article 18.02 1 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure in 1981.

See TEX. CODE CRIM .

PRO. ANN. art. 18.021 (Vernon Supp. 1982-83).

This provi sion

specifically permits the obtaining of a search warrant to search
for and photograph a child alleged to be the victim of any of
-

21 -

[
the following:

(a) injury to a child [Section 22.04);

(b) sexual

assault of a child [Section 22.0ll(a)] or aggravated sexual
assault of a child [Section 22.021].

Session Laws, 68th Legis-

[_
[_

__

lature, Ch. 977, p. 5311, 5319 (1983).
The purpose of this special warrant is to obtain access to
the injured child while the injuries are still of evidentiary
value.

Of course, where a parent or guardian brings the child

forth to report the abusive conduct of another, no warrant is
required.

[_
[_

[_

It is worth noting at this point that a parent wil-

ling to testify against the abuser will not be foreclosed from
doing so by the husband-wife privilege.

One of the few excep-

tions permitting voluntary testimony by one spouse against another
is "in any case for an offense involving any grade of assault or

[
[

[__

violence committed by one • . • against the child of either under
16 years of age • . • . "

TEX. CODE CRI.M. PRO. ANN. art. 38.11

(Vernon 1979) •
Similarly, when the injury is discovered by a treating physician, teacher or babysitter, nothing prevents that person from

[

L

[__

photographing the injury and giving it to the police or testifying
at trial.

The application of Article 18.021 is therefore limited

in practice to those cases in which abuse is alleged and no one
brings the child forth.
Probable cause is required for such a warrant as in other
cases.

TEX. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 18.0l(f)

1982-83).

Additionally, the affidavit

must set forth facts showing:
been committed;

(Vernon Supp.

supportin~

the warrant

(a) that a specific offense has

(b) that a specifically described person has
- 22 -
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c

been a victim of the offense;

(c) that evidence of the offense

or evidence that a particular person committed the offense .can
be detected by photographic means; and (d) that the person to
be searched for and photographed is located at the particular
place to be searched.

Id.

A warrant issued must in turn identify the child to be located and photographed, specify the place or thing to be searched,
and command any peace officer of the proper county to search

I

for and cause the child to be photographed.

TEX. CODE CRIM .

PRO. ANN . art. 18.02l(c) (Vernon Supp. 1982-83).

I

I
I

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

In executing

the warrant, the officer may be accompanied by a photographer
acting at the direction of the officer.

This photographer has

the right of access to the child under authority of the warrant.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 18.02l(b) (Vernon Supp. 1982-83).
Interestingly, a warrant obtained under Article 18.021 must
be execute d by an officer of the same sex as the alleged victim
or the officer must be assisted by such an officer.

TEX. CODE

CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 18.'02l(e) {Vernon Supp. 1982-83) .

If an

assistant is us e d, he or sh~ must be present during the photographing of the child.

Id. Presumably, this limitation is d e -

sig ned t o insure no inappropriate behavior on the part o f the
officer executing the warrant, although the statute does not
elabo rate on what the role of the assistant should be in such
cases.
Return o f a search warrant issued under Article 18.021 is
made b y the officer taking possession of the exposed film and
delivering it "forthwith" to the magistrate.
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TEX. CODE CRIM.

[
PRO. ANN. art. 18.02l(d)

(Vernon Supp. 1982-83).

[.

Curiously,

to remove the child from the premises except under Section

c

17.03 of the Family Code.

[_

the officer executing the warrant is not thereby authorized

!d. Once the child is found and

photographed, the purposes of the warrant have been served

[

and other action to protect the interests of the child must

[_

be taken under proper authority of law other than that of
Article 18.021.

Although no cases have been decided construing

[~

this article, one supposes that all of these provisions will
be held directory and not mandatory as has been done in other
warrant execution cases.

See, e.g., Barnes v. State, 504 S.W.2d

["

450 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).

[_

IV.

[

Punishment

The punishment for Injury to a Child or an Elderly Individual
is determined by the level of culpability involved in committing

r
[~

the crime and the degree of harm inflicted on the victim. · See
generally, TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. Sec. 22.04(b)-(d)
1982-83).

(Vernon Supp.

For purposes of punishment, the three highest levels

of injury are treated without distinction.

If the actor causes

serious bodily injury, serious physical or mental deficiency

o~

[~

L
L-

impairment, or disfigurement or deformity, the offense is a first
degree felony if the act is committed intentionally or knowingly.
Reckless infliction of any of these levels of injury is a third
degree felony.

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. SEC. 22.04(b)

(Vernon Supp .

C

r
L

1982-83).
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Where the lowest level of injury, bodily injury, results,
the offense is a third degree felony if the conduct was intentional or knowing.

Reckless infliction of bodily ;injury on a

child or elderly individual is a Class A misdemeanor.

TEX.

PENAL CODE ANN. Sec. 22 . 04(c)

If crimi-

(Vernon Supp. 1982-83).

nal negligence, the lowest level of culpability, is shown, the
offense is a Class A misdemeanor
injury inflicted.

regardless of the level of

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. Sec. 22.04(d)

(Vernon

Supp. 1982-83).
In light of the punishment scheme for Injury to a Child or
Elderly Individual, definitions of culpability and degrees of
injury take on increased importance.

These cases ·are not like

others in which the culpability inquiry is a limited threshold
one which, once met by proof that some
pability exists, ceases to be relevant.

accep~able leve~

of cul-

Rather, the precise

level of culpability has meaning since it is by this means that
punishment is determined.
The punishment scheme of Section 22.04 is less affected by
variations in the proof of degrees of injury.

Even so, a signi-

ficant difference in punishment exists between proof of bodily
injury and the

other, higher levels of injury.

It is therefore

critical that unusual care be taken in the charging of these
crimes; introducing evidence at trial going to culpability and
degree of injury; instructing the
and structuring the

punis~ent

jury

on relevant definitions;

phase to properly address elements

usually thought to be only important on guilt or innocence.

I
I

Prosecutions brought under Section 22.04 seem especially
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[__
susceptible of a form of special issue submission as is found in
civil practice in Texas .

Of course, general verdicts are now

required in criminal cases .
(Vernon 1979).

TEX. CODE CRIM. PRO . ANN. art . 37 . 07

L
[ __

It is therefore incumbent on the State to allege

culpability and injury level with particularity in these cases;
failure to do so should entitle the defendant to have the indictment quashed.
Yet another peculiarity found in Section 22 . 04 case lies in
the unavailability of one defense common to assaults.

Consent is

apparently not a defense as in assault, aggravated assault, or
reckless conduct.

See TEX . PENAL CODE ANN .

Sec . 2 2 . 06 (Vernon

1974).
In many respects then, Injury to a Child or Elderly Individual
remains a new, unusual and largely unknown crime.

Its peculiar

structure and continually changing contours suggest that its futur e
lies as much in the hands of appellate lawyers and the c o urts as
in the iegislature .

[~
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